Transition Factors of Power Consumption Models for CPA Attacks on Cryptographic RISC-V SoC

Physical cryptographic devices are vulnerable to side-channel information leakages during operation. They are widely used in software as well as hardware implementations, ranging from microcontrollers and microprocessors to hardware accelerators in System on Chips (SoCs). Nowadays, cryptographic RISC-V SoCs are becoming the most prominent solution compared to the rest. Cryptographic accelerators provide users with a very high level of flexibility and customization of chips suited to specific applications in these systems. First, this research aims to confirm the effectiveness of the Correlation Power Analysis attack on cryptographic SoCs based on three different power consumption models. In each model, the effectiveness of an attack depends on the transition factor, which is a ratio related to different characteristics of the device's power consumption. Then, we focus on modifying the configuration on the SoC and attacking the AES hardware implementation on these designs. The experimental results show that applying the Switching Distance model brings the highest performance. With our suggested range of transition factors, the number of traces needed to find the secret key can be reduced by 13.35% in the best case. IEEE