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An Efficient Hiding Countermeasure with Xilinx MMCM Primitive in Spread Mode

Tran, T.-H. and Hoang, V.-P. and Le, D.-H. and Hoang, T.-T. and Pham, C.-K. (2024) An Efficient Hiding Countermeasure with Xilinx MMCM Primitive in Spread Mode. In: 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2024, 19 May 2024 Through 22 May 2024, Singapore.

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Abstract

The Mixed-Mode Clock Manager (MMCM) is a primitive in Xilinx FPGAs that is designed for generating a wide range of output clock frequencies by utilizing a fixed input clock signal. It has been applied to numerous cryptographic devices to improve their side-channel attack resistance. This paper proposes an efficient hiding countermeasure by using the MMCM in spread spectrum mode. In our suggested architecture, the hardware implementation is given by random dynamic frequency-hopping signals. We could achieve better effectiveness in the occupied bandwidth metrics and found 223 available parameter sets, which is significantly smaller than using 219k distinct sets in a previous study, namely a random dynamic frequency scaling countermeasure. The experimental results indicate that a recent deep learning-based leakage assessment requires nearly one million traces to detect leakage points, whereas the well-known t-test methodology cannot detect any information leakage in five million measurements. Furthermore, this countermeasure is capable of withstanding both conventional and sliding window-based Correlation Power Analysis attacks, despite utilizing up to five million power traces. © 2024 IEEE.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Divisions: Institutes > Institute of System Integration
Identification Number: 10.1109/ISCAS58744.2024.10558293
Uncontrolled Keywords: Clocks; Deep learning; Dynamic frequency scaling, Chaotic clock; Chaotics; Clock frequency; Countermeasure; Mixed mode; Random dynamics; Side-channel analyse attack; Side-channel analysis; Spread-spectrum signals; Xilinx FPGA, Side channel attack
Additional Information: Conference of 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2024 ; Conference Date: 19 May 2024 Through 22 May 2024; Conference Code:200792
URI: http://eprints.lqdtu.edu.vn/id/eprint/11394

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